The Benefits of a Large Republic: Thoughts by James Madison, April 1787.

James Madison showed up to the Constitutional Convention with a plan--The Virginia Plan--a large part of which became the United States Constitution. Part of his preparation for the Convention was to analyze the Articles of Confederation. This task resulted in an essay entitled, Vices of the Political System of the United States.

In one part of this essay, Madison addressed the fact that all "civilized societies" divide into factions. He recognized "three motives only" that restrain a majority from oppressing a minority: a prudent regard for the rights of others coupled with a recognition that majority interests are tied to minority interests; character, which is diminished when individuals can distribute responsibility among many; and religion.

All of these are insufficient to restrain a majority from oppressing a minority. Illustrative of this for Madison was what he viewed as corrupt and factional government at the state level, i.e., in small republics. What was the solution? A large republic.

This post covers Madison's reasoning.

August Glen-James, editor

Place three individuals in a situation wherein the interest of each depends on the voice of the others; and give to two of them an interest opposed to the rights of the third. Will the latter be secure? The prudence of every man would shun the danger. The rules & forms of justice suppose & guard against it. Will two thousand in a like situation be less likely to encroach on the rights of on thousand? The contrary is witnessed by the notorious factions & oppressions which take place in corporate towns limited as the opportunities are, and in little republics when uncontrolled by apprehensions of external danger. If an enlargement of the sphere is found to lessen the insecurity of private rights, it is not because the impulse of a common interest or passion is less predominant in this case with the majority; but because a common interest or passion is less apt to be felt and the requisite combinations less easy to be formed by a great than by a small number. The society becomes broken into a greater variety of interests, of pursuits of passions, which check each other, whilst those who may feel a common sentiment have less opportunity of communication and concert. It may be inferred that the inconveniences of popular States, contrary to the prevailing Theory, are in proportion not to the extent, but to the narrowness of their limits.

The great desideratum in Government is such a modification of the sovereignty as will render it sufficiently neutral between the different interests and factions, to control one part of the society from invading the rights of another, and at the same time sufficiently controlled itself, from setting up an interest adverse to that of the whole Society.  In absolute Monarchies the prince is sufficiently neutral towards his subjects, but frequently sacrifices their happiness to his ambition or his avarice. In small Republics, the sovereign will is sufficiently controlled from such a sacrifice of the entire Society, but is not sufficiently neutral towards the parts composing it. As a limited monarchy tempers the evils of an absolute one; so an extensive Republic meliorates the administration of a small Republic.

An auxiliary desideratum for the melioration of the Republican form is such a process of elections as will most certainly extract from the mass of the society the purest and noblest characters which it contains; such as will at once feel most strongly the proper motives to pursue the end of their appointment, and be most capable to devise the proper means of attaining it.