Envy in a Republic & the Defense of Rome: Thoughts by Machiavelli

Although Machiavelli is best known for The Prince, his Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius is seen by many as his most substantial work. 

In Discourses, Machiavelli plumbed Livy’s work to extract lessons and principles from Roman history in order to repurpose them for his time. The two excerpts in this post come from Book 3, Chapter XXX. In this chapter, Machiavelli addressed (a) the importance of suppressing feelings of envy in “a citizen who desires to employ his authority in a republic for some public good” and (b) how best to defend the city of Rome.

The context here is Roman preparations for an impending war with the Volscians. The Tribune, Camillus, suggested that Rome may dispense with the creation of a Dictator if his colleagues would consent to giving him supreme power. “To this they promptly assented, ‘persuaded,’ says Titus Livius, ‘that the adding to the authority of Camillus would not in the least detract from theirs.’”

Machiavelli incorporated this story into his theme of envy. “This example shows us what great services a good and wise man can render to his country, when his virtues and goodness have silenced envy, which so often prevents men from being useful by depriving them of the authority necessary for important occasions.” 

Machiavelli then addressed, in the first post below, the two ways envy can be extinguished. Readers may notice here the ruthlessness for which Machiavelli is notable. In the second post, Machiavelli makes some interesting observations about Camillus’s plan for defending the “Eternal City.”

August Glen-James, editor

Here are his thoughts:

On Envy:

“Envy may be extinguished in two ways: either by some extraordinary and difficult occasion, when every one fears his own destruction, and therefore lays aside all ambition, and eagerly obeys anyone whom he supposes capable of averting the danger by his virtues and talents. Such was the case with Camillus, who, having given so many proofs of his eminent merit, was three times made Dictator; and having always administered this high office for the public good and without selfish views, other men did not fear his greatness and did not deem it discreditable to acknowledge their own inferiority to a man of such distinguished worth and reputation. The observation of Titus Livius upon this circumstance was therefore very just. [Said observation is quoted in the introduction.]

“The other way of destroying envy is, when either violence or a natural death carries off those of your rivals who on seeing you acquire such reputation and greatness cannot patiently bear your being more distinguished than themselves. If men of this kind live in a corrupt city, where education has not been able to infuse any spirit of good into their minds, it is impossible that they should be restrained by any chance, but they would be willing rather to see their country ruined than not to attain their purpose, or not to satisfy their perverse natures. To overcome such envy and evil passions there is no other remedy but the death of those who harbor them. 

“And when fortune is so propitious to a virtuous man as to deliver him from such rivals by their natural death, he becomes glorious without violence, and may then display his virtues to their full extent without hinderance and without offense to anybody. But when he has not such good fortune, he must strive nevertheless by all possible means to overcome this difficulty, and relieve himself of such rivals before attempting any enterprise. And whoever reads the Bible attentively will find that Moses, for the purpose of insuring the observance of his laws and institutions, was obliged to have a great many persons put to death who opposed his designs under instigation of no other feelings than those of envy and jealousy.”

On Defense:

“Let us now come to the other part of our subject, namely, the orders given by Camillus, inside and outside of the city, for the safety of Rome. And it is truly with good reason that historians such as Titus Livius give a more exact and detailed account of certain events, so that future generations may learn therefrom how to defend themselves under similar circumstances. And here we must remark that there is not a more ineffectual and hazardous mode of defending a city than to do it in a disorderly and tumultuous manner. This is shown by the precaution which Camillus took to raise a third regular army for the protection of the city, which was then and may still be regarded by some to have been superfluous, inasmuch as the people of the city were warlike and used to arms. And therefore they considered it unnecessary to raise a special army, as it would have been sufficient to arm the citizens when occasion should require it. 

“But Camillus thought differently, and every wise person will share his opinion; for he never would permit a multitude to take to arms without order or discipline. And according to his example, any one charged with the defense of a city should avoid, as a dangerous rock, the arming of a tumultuous multitude; but he should select and enroll those whom he wants to arm, and teach them whom they have to obey, the places for assembling, and where to march; and then he must order those who are not enrolled to remain at home to protect their houses. Those who adopt this system in a city that is attacked will easily be able to defend it, whilst those who act otherwise and disregard the example of Camillus will surely fail.”